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"INCOME IN RESPECT OF A DECEDENT"
AND SALES TRANSACTIONS
DONALD H. GORDONt
So familiar is the notion that nothing in this world is certain but
death and taxes that it is curious how much uncertainty attends the
consequence of their juxtaposition in sales transactions. For a yet to
be rationalized anomaly is the federal income tax result, where the
death of a vendor takes place before the consummation of a sale the
agreement for which was executed or negotiated by the vendor during
his lifetime.
This anomaly involves the meaning and application of the phrase
"income in respect of a decedent."1 On a practical level this often in-
volves questions of whether decedent-vendor's successor in interest'
will or will not be obliged to pay income taxes on the sale and, if so,
what rates3 will be applicable.
The term "income in respect of a decedent" is not defined in the
Internal Revenue Code.' Its meaning must be approached by ref-
erence to the problems of income tax administration that its use was
intended to solve. Unfortunately, however, statutory history alone
does not provide a suitable explanation of the operation of this phrase
with respect to sales. Therefore, it is necessary to inquire further into
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan.
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691.
2. Such successor in interest may be an executor, administrator, legatee or
devisee.
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § I or § 1201 and § 1202.
4. The full text of § 691(a) (1) is as follows:
(a) INCLUSION IN GROSS INCOME.-
(1) GENERAL RUL--The amount of all items of gross income in re-
spect of a decedent which are not properly includible in respect of the
taxable period in which falls the date of his death or a prior period (in-
cluding the amount of all items of gross income in respect of a prior
decedent, if the right to receive such amount .'"as acquired by reason
of the death of the prior decedent or by bequest, devise, or inheritance
from the prior decedent) shall be included in the gross income, for the
taxable year when received, of:
(A) the estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the amount
is acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent;
(B) the person who, by reason of the death of the decedent,
acquires the right to receive the amount, if the right to receive the
amount is not acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent; or
(C) the person who acquires from the decedent the right to receive
the amount by bequest, devise, or inheritance, if the amount is re-
ceived after a distribution by the decedent's estate of such right.
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the several distinct tax policy judgments which converge in this area,
in order to understand the difficulties with which the subject abounds.
Ultimately a resolution of the difficulties depends upon the adoption
of a treatment which will result in a successful blend of these several
judgments. This, as will be seen, is not easy since the mixture tends
to curdle. However, certainly no omelet can be hoped for unless some
eggs are broken.
I.
Historically, the problem of a decedent's income was first regarded
primarily as a matter of tax accountings Prior to 1934, when a cash
method taxpayer died, the income accrued but not received at the date
of his death escaped the income tax altogether. To prevent this
revenue loss and to avoid the inequity in treatment between cash and
accrual method taxpayers, the law was amended in 1934 to provide
for the accrual of income items to the date of death in the final return
of the cash method taxpayer.6 Thus tax avoidance was eliminated
and equity among taxpayers restored. The Supreme Court, however,
construed the term "accruals" as used in the 1934 amendment quite
broadly, departing from traditional accounting practice in order, as
it said, to further "the intent of Congress to cover [sic] into income
the assets of decedents, earned during their life and unreported as
income... ."' This construction resulted in what was thought to be an
excessive piling up of income in decedents' final returns., Therefore,
in 1942 the law was again amended to add what is now section 691.
Section 691 was intended to resolve the dilemma presented by a
broad construction of the term "accruals" on the one hand and by tax
avoidance and inequity on the other.10 This it did by requiring an
inclusion of the income items in the return of the decedent's successor
when the items were in fact received. The Senate Report stated that
"This provision is designed to place the person described"i ... in the
same position with respect to the nature of this income as the position
5. See Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 87 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 295 (1939); Shelton, Problems that Come with Filing the Income Tax
Returns of Decedents, Minors and Incompetents, N.Y.U. 8th Inst. on Fed. Tax
1176 (1950).
6. Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 4-6 (9th Cir. 1954); S. Rep. No. 558,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934); 2 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 12.100
(Zimet & Stanley Rev. 1955).
7. Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636, 644 (1941).
8. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance on Revenue Revision Act
of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
9. Note 4 supra.
10. Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 1024 (1952).
11. The "person described" is the decedent's successor in interest.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss1/7
32 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the decedent enjoyed."12 Subsequently, however, the provision was
read more expansively by the courts. It was intended, said the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, not only to prevent bunching of
income in a decedent's final return, but also to "avoid the loss of in-
come taxes which would have been received were it not for the death
of the decedent."3
To appreciate the significance of this expansion and its relevance
to sales transactions, it is necessary to consider the cases which
initiated the recognition of the entire problem. They were, in the
main, cases dealing with personal service income which had been
earned but not received at the date of death.-' In this area the func-
tion of section 691 has been to obviate the necessity of a referral to
accounting terms. Thus, in O'Daniel's Estate,"5 although decedent
employee had no enforceable right to a share in a bonus declared by
his employer for the year prior to his death,'2 the court held its re-
ceipt by his estate "income in respect of a decedent" and, therefore,
taxable to the fiduciary as ordinary income.2
The word "accrual" is an accounting term which describes one of
several possible methods by which items of cost and receipt may
reasonably be attributed to a particular period of time.28 Such an
allocation is of most significance in cases which involve a continuing
business activity, for it is principally in this context that a choice
among different time periods becomes important to a taxpayer." Per-
sonal service is, of course, a major kind of continuing business activity.
Accordingly, it is not difficult to see why accounting methods became
relevant in the cases of deceased taxpayers who were engaged in this
type of activity. It is understandable, as well, therefore, that any
extension of the coverage of section 691 beyond the cases in the
personal service area should take place in another familiar area of
continuing business activity-the area of sales transactions. Whether
12. S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942).
13. Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1954); cf. Kreig & Busch-
man, Section 126: Items of Gross Income in Respect of a Decedent, 32 Taxes
651 (1954).
14. Estate of Edgar V. O'Daniel, 10 T.C. 631 (1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 966 (2d
Cir. 1949) ; Estate of Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627 (1947) ; Loe M. R. Peyton, 44 B.T.A.
1246 (1941); Lillian 0. Fehrman, 38 B.T.A. 37 (1938); Antoinette B. Held,
3 B.T.A. 408 (1926); G.C.M. 21040, 1939-1 Cune. Bull. 242.
15. Estate of Edgar V. O'Daniel, supra note 14.
16. Ordinarily there would be no accrual of a contingent item in such a case.
17. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-1(b) (3) (1960).
18. See Holland, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 149
(1949).
19. This significance is mitigated to some extent by the provisions of the Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 172 relating to net operating loss carrybacks and carryovera
and by the provisions of Int. Rev. Cdde of 1954, §§ 1301-08.
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such an extension is, on this basis, to be made to sales which do not
occur in the "continuing business activity" setting is another matter.
An extension to sales outside this setting must be based on a view of
section 691 which de-emphasizes its genesis in the problem of account-
ing methods and involves a broader concept of its utility. The exten-
sion of section 691 to income from sales:o has, in any event, eliminated
what might have been one limitation on the definition of "income in
respect of a decedent," i.e., as "income arising from the personal
efforts of the decedent."
The next possible limitation might have been looked for in the
character of the income to which a transaction gives rise. Such a
touchstone is suggested by Estate of Sarah L. Narischkine,21 where
the decedent's executors collected arrearages on alimony due her
from her ex-husband. The court held the receipts "income in respect
of a decedent" since if decedent had collected them they would have
represented ordinary income in her hands.2 2 If this were accepted
as a limitation on the phrase, one could say "income in respect of a
decedent" is income which, if collected by decedent, would have been
ordinary income rather than capital gain. Although such a limitation
would not have prevented the application of section 691 to sales which
take place as part of a continuing business activity, it is clear that
this limitation is not accepted by the Treasury.23
One further possibility for limiting the applicability of section 691
might be investigated. What relevance has the character of an asset
which produces the income? Is it significant whether the asset is a
capital asset24 in decedent's hands? In Lattendresse v. Commis-
sioner25 certain contracts which were purchased by decedent were
capital assets and yet their collection by his widow was held income
20. Note 6 supra. But see Drye, The Taxation of a Decedent's Income, 8 Tax
L. Rev. 201 (1953); cf. Commissioner v. Alldis' Estate, 140 F.2d 885 (6th Cir.
1944).
21. 14 T.C. 1128 (1950).
22. See also Scott, A Critique of Section 126, 26 Taxes 127, 131 (1948).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-3 (b) (1) (1957). However, it should be noted that
neither is it always true that if decedent would have realized ordinary income
(had he lived), it therefore follows that his successor has ordinary income. See
Estate of Jacques Ferber, 22 T.C. 261 (1954). Some cases, on the other hand, are
to the contrary. Dixon v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Ky. 1950), aff'd
per curiam, 192 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1951); Estate of Thomas F. Reminton, 9 T.C.
99 (1947). See also Rev. Rul. 162, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 224. These latter cases
involve personal service, however, and may fall within § 691 for this reason alone.
But see Latendresse v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1957), where items
of income involving both personal services and investment by the deceased re-
sulted in § 691 treatment.
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221.
25. Latendresse v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1957).
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in respect of a decedent.6 On the other hand, crops in the hands of a
farmer are not capital assets, yet they have been ruled not to be sec-
tion 691 items when disposed of by a decedent farmer's estate.2"
• If, then, neither the nature of the income, nor the nature of the
transaction which generated it, nor the character of the asset involved.
serves in present practice as a criterion for defining and delimiting
"income in respect of a decedent," what guide posts exist for defini-
tion and prognosis?
•II.
Three major tax policy judgments in addition to those of section
691 itself and the tax accounting sections28 converge in the phrase
"income in respect of a decedent"
The Policy of Section 1014
It has long been the general rule that assets held by a decedent at
his death take on a basis equal to their fair market value at the date
of death in the hands of his successor ;29 thus, there is no income tax
a ssessed on their appreciation from cost during his lifetime.-o The
rule is easier to state than to justify, for it represents a complete
divergence from the usual operation of the tax law.S. Moreover, its
economic consequence, an encouragement of the retention of appre-
ciated assets, has been deplored.32 Irrespective of the wisdom of such
a policy, it is clear that it conflicts with the operation of section 691,
for an asset whose sale involves income in respect of a decedent does
not take a section 1014 basis, but rather retains the decedent's basis.-
Since there is no evidence that the enactment of the predecessor of
section 691 was initiated because of a general dissatisfaction with the
policy of section 1014, the limitation which in fact resulted from
section 691 arose as its consequence rather than as its purpose.31 It is
26. Although a capital asset was involved, if decedent had collected the pro-
ceeds, ordinary income would have resulted because there would have been no
sale or exchange as required by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222. See Galvin Hud-
son, 20 T.C. 734 .(1953). On the other hand, if decedent had sold the contract
before collection there would have been capital gain.
27. Rev. Rul. 436, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 366; see also Estate of Jacques Ferber, 22
T.C. 261 (1954). Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(b) (4).
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 441-43, 446.
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014.
'30. The appreciation is, of course, reached by the Federal Estate Tax. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2031.
31. Usually appreciation is included in gross income on the disposition of the
asset. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a) (3).
32. See Groves, Taxation of Capital Gains, 2 Tax Revision Compendium 1193
(1959).
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014 (c).
34. Pp. 3142 supra,
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difficult to weigh conflicting policy judgments under such circum-
stances. However, one could hazard the suggestion that the back-
ground of section 691, as outlined in the first part of this article,3s
seems to exhibit greater rationality than does the general policy of
section 1014. It should also be recalled that the rationality of section
691 really stems from its treatment of ordinary income items 6 and
thus might not be considered as outweighing section 1014 in the area
of capital gains.
The Policy of Subchapter P
As every adult and many children know, income tax policy favors
considerably the realization of income in the form of gains from the
sale or exchange of capital assets held for more than 6 months .3
About this favoritism has grown a cluster of distinctions related to
the nature of the particular asset,38 the means of its disposition, 
3
the status of the disposing taxpayer 0 and many others. Although the
plethora of artificiality and misuse which has typified the statutory
development of this field tends to obscure and even to adulterate the
basis of such favoritism, it is possible to defend the idea that a major
rationale of the favoritism is based upon a desire to afford relief
against taxing in one year, at steeply progressive rates, the accumu-
lated appreciation of many.4 1 Thus, since the sale of assets which
have appreciated in value over the course of several years will be
infrequent in the economic lives of most taxpayers, capital gain
treatment might be expected to result with respect to intermittent
transactions as opposed to those transactions which regularly recur.
Section 691 treats income in respect of a decedent "as having the
same character it would have had if the decedent (or a prior dece-
dent) had lived and received such amount."'42 But this does not tell
us which sales transactions are to be treated as yielding income in
respect of a decedent and which are not. Thus, although apparently
the reference to decedent's treatment is preserved in section 691,"
the section itself seems to be neutral with respect to the policy of
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1201.
38. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221.
39. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222.
40. The distinction between assets held in trade or business and those held for
investment are of particular significance.
41. The distinction between investment property and inventory, and the impor-
tance of the holding period point to this. See generally, ALI Discussion Draft
of a study of Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation (Oct. 20, 1960).
42. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-3(a) (1957).
43. Note 28 supra.
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subchapter P. The chief difficulty lies in determining which such
transactions were sufficiently matured during decedent's lifetime as
to result in such income upon their completion after his death. Thus,
a third policy line becomes relevant.
The Policy of Lucas v. Earl"
Attempts by taxpayers through inter vivos donative assignments
of their claims to income, in order to redu.ce the tax burden on their
families, have spawned a progeny of cases, the holdings of which, in
substance, are that the income is taxable to the assignor whose efforts
created i. 5 But since this result does not follow in all cases of gift
assignments, we must determine in which cases it does obtain. The
line of cases under Lucas v. Earl- would apparently pick out only
those situations where the product of the assignment is ordinary
income.
Somewhat similar to the issue in Lucas v. Earl was the problem
presented by certain cases in the field of corporate liquidations.'"
Here the question was whether the gain from a sale of corporate
assets in a liquidation should be attributed to the liquidating share-
holders or to the corporation. If the sale was attributed to the share-
holders, only one tax was paid on it; but if to the liquidating corpora-
tion, then, in effect, the gain was taxed twice. Legislation has now
resolved this difficulty of determining how a given case is to be
treated in this regard.4s But from the cases which arose under prior
law, one could extract the notion that when the problem of which of
two taxpayers should be regarded as having effected a sale is raised,
"'the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the
commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is
relevant." 9 According to such a view, one would, in the section 691
cases, look to see to what extent decedent's activities constituted the
principal moving force in the transaction or to what extent it was his
successor whose actions constituted the prime cause of the ultimate
consummation of the transaction.
44. 291 U.S. 111 (1930).
45. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S.
122 (1940); Strauss v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1948); Hogle v.
Commissioner, 132 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1942). By analogy § 691 characterizes a
transactioi by reference to the decedent whose efforts brought it about. See
Holland, Kennedy, Surrey & Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income
Tax Treatment of -Trusts and Estates-American Law Institute Draft, 53 Colum.
L. Rev. 316,7372 (1953).
46. Note 44 supra.
47. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) and United States
v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950) are the best known.
48. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 337.
49. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
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III.
Turning to the language of section 691 itself, we find it requires
the inclusion by the recipient in his gross income of "the amount of
all items of gross income in respect of a decedent" where "the right
to receive the amount" has been "acquired ... from the decedent." 50
The problem of determining which sales transactions are included
within this language and which are not, centers upon tle question
whether decedent's successor, in a given, case, acquired a "right to
receive" the proceeds of the disposition from the decedent or acquired
an asset from the decedent the proceeds of whose disposition are not
attributable to a "right" acquired from the decedent.
As an original matter one might have argued that the advantage of
the acquisition of a stepped-up basis under section 1014 should not be
lost if decedent in some way initiated a sale prior to his death, since
whether he did or not his beneficiary certainly owns whatever he re-
ceives as an acquisition from the decedent, and, therefore, nothing
should turn on whether he receives a "right" or any other kind of
asset. Indeed, it is perhaps in this apparent hairsplitting that the
strongest argument against the application of section 691 to sales
(at least to those which would result in capital gain) is grounded. 51
Nevertheless, it is clear that this distinction is the crux of the matter.52
Thus it is established that if decedent had, during his lifetime, entered
into a contract of sale incomplete at his death only as to delivery of the
res and receipt of the purchase price, when his executor receives the
proceeds of the sale, section 691 applies. On the other hand, if the
executor had himself initiated and carried out the sale, the section
would not apply and gain would be measured by the value of the asset
at date of death.5 3
There are, of course, intermediate situations as to which doubt may
be justified. For example, suppose decedent had given a lease of
property during his lifetime which granted the lessee an option to
purchase. If the option is exercised after death does the estate have
income in respect of a decedent? The answer is hard to come by be-
cause the rationale of section 691's application to sales is not clear.
Certainly, as to all executory contracts, strong motivation is afforded
by the present law for decedent's successor in interest to attempt to
50. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691(a) (1).
51. See p. 33 supra.
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), Ex. 5(1) (1960).
53. Drye, The Taxation of a Decedent's Income, supra note 20, at 206; d.
Craven, Taxation of Income of Decedents, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 185, 212 (1953);
Young, Linde Decision Confuses Tax Treatment of Cash-basis Decedents Inven-
tory, 4 J. Taxation 160, 162 (1956).
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avoid the transaction. If he can do so and then arrange a new sale
he will have the advantage of a stepped-up basis.5'
Prior to Commissioner v. Linde,15 the status of consignments or
pooling agreements was doubtful. Now the dicta of the Linde Case"
and the regulations"? establish that they too are considered within the
coverage of the section. The Internal Revenue Service has, of course,
read Linde broadly, holding that whenever the decedent, even short
of an actual contract of sale, has placed the asset "beyond his dominion
and control" section 691 income may result."8
Substantial difficulties with this view have appeared in the area of
shareholder contracts to sell stock in close corporations on death."
The danger has been lessened through a ruling0 now incorporated in
the regulations.6 How this self-limitation by the Treasury can be
squared with the broad view taken in other kinds of transactions"2 is
hard to see, except as a matter of administrative self-restraint in a
special area where the outcry of taxpayers might have been the cause
of extensive litigation.
It has been suggested that a distinction should be made between
contracts made by a decedent which the vendee may specifically en-
force and those for breach of which only an action for damages would
lie. 63 As to the former, section 691 would be applicable. The trouble
with such a view is twofold. First; the law relating to specific per-
formance has as its touchstone the adequacy of a legal remedy, a
criterion having little to do with whatever may be considered the
relevant criteria under section 691. Second, modern substantive
development in the law of sales, when combined with procedural
developments, tend to make the choice of remedy discretionary with
the court.6' Under these circumstances, little of value for tax admin-
istration might be expected from a reference to the law of equity.5
54. .Note, Income in Respect of Decedents, The Scope of Section 126, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 1030 (1952).
55. 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1954).
56. Id. at 7.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), Ex. 5(2) (1957).
58. Rev. Rul. 436, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 366.
59. Hilgedag, Taxing Good Will Under Purchase Agreements, 81 Trusts & Es-
tates 285, 285-87 (1945).
60. T.D. 5459, 1945-1 Cum. Bull. 193.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), Ex. 4 (1957).
62. See notes 55-57 supra.
63. Guterman, New Problems Under Section 126 in Income and Estate Tax,
24 Taxes 633 (1946).
64. Uniform Sales Act § 68; Uniform Commercial Code § 2-716.
65. See Voegelin, Income Taxation of Inherited Intangible Assets, U. So. Cal.
1954 Tax Inst. 587, 596-97. See also Kennedy, Federal Income Taxation of Trusts
and Estates 469 (1948).
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IV.
It would seem a fair appraisal, in view of the foregoing, that the
present treatment of sales transactions under section 691 is unsatis-
factory on several grounds. First, because the history of the section
affords little justification for its application to them.6 Second, be-
cause a limitation in the policy of section 1014 has not been justified
by any reference to revenue avoidance situations which are peculiar to
decedents who have, in some way, initiated a disposition of an asset
prior to their death.6" Third, because the treatment has not differen-
tiated between transactions which would result in capital gains and
those which would result in ordinary income6k--a distinction which
would seem quite relevant in terms of revenue loss and the accounting
issues which gave rise to the entire problem. It remains, therefore,
to consider the possible alternatives to current practice.
One view is oriented to the causal relationship between decedent's
lifetime activity and the production of the income item.69 Because, in
all cases, there is some causal relationship, the problem raised by this
view is one of line drawing. Presumably, the mere ownership by a
decedent of an asset later sold by the executor or beneficiary does not
involve a sufficient causal connection for section 691 to be made appli-
cable. At the other extreme, a sales contract executed and substan-
tially performed during the decedent's lifetime would involve a
sufficient causal connection to the collection of the proceeds by the
executor or beneficiary for application of section 691. But for the
in-between cases 70 this view offers no rationale. Nor can the other
relevant policy judgments which converge in this area be used to
clarify the degree of causal connection which would act as the divid-
ing line.71
A second rationalization proceeds from a distinction between re-
curring and sporadic items in the economic life of the particular tax-
payer.72 Here the notion is that as to recurring sales, the taxpayer has
little choice in timing and therefore, his reliance in the policy of
section 1014 is minimal, whereas in sporadic sale situations he may
well decide to withhold because of the basis step-up advantage of that
provision. Hence, section 691, if applied to the former situations, will
66. P. 31 supra.
67. Pp. 34-35 supra.
68. Pp. 33-34 supra.
69. Fink, Recent Developments Under Section 126, N.Y.U. 7th Inst. on Fed.
Tax 731, 732-33 (1949); Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of
Section 126, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1024, 1027 (1952).
70. See pp. 32-34 supra.
71. See pp. 34-36 supra.
72. Note, Income in Respect of Decedents, supra note 69, at 1034. See also p.
35 supra.
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involve practically no intrusion into the policy of section 1014. It is,
however, possible to make the opposite argument: that a taxpayer's
freedom of choice in timing ought not to result in tax benefit; that the
taxpayer who must sell should be treated no less advantageously than
the taxpayer who might sell or not as he chooses. The result of this
argument would lead either to the treatment of both recurring and
sporadic sales under section 691 or to the treatment of neither there-
under."3
A third approach is more drastic. It would revoke the current policy
of section 1014 altogether and apply the income tax to all appreciated
assets at the death of their owner.7' The difficulty here, lies of course
in the collection of income tax on unrealized gain. Its effect would be
to force sales at death to raise tax money, a result as difficult to justify
as the present effect of section 1014 in encouraging retention of assets
until death. No matter to which kind of assets or transactions section
691 applies, it at least avoids this result, since the inclusion in gross
income depends on receipt."5
A fourth view of the reasonable application of section 691 sees the
problem as one of classification of assets.78 Such a classification, it is
anticipated, would be applicable in other areas as well.77 It would
treat amounts received from the sale of inventory as coming within
section 691 on the notion that most taxpayers will be on the accrual
or inventory accounting method and that differences in choice of
accounting method should not result in discrimination." On this point
it should be noted that the result is consistent with the genesis of
section 691. 79 Moreover, as to inventory, it is argued that just as in
the case of personal service income,80 the policy of section 1014 does
not apply because ordinary income rates and not capital gain rates
would be avoided.,1 On the other hand, this approach would exclude
amounts received from the sale of capital assets from a definition of
73. There is even a departure from the capital gain treatment rationale on
this point in the case of inventors.
74. See Groves, Taxation of Capital Gains, 2 Tax Revision Compendium 1193-
99 (1959).
75. See p. 31 supra, and Note, Income in Respect of Decedents, supra note 69,
at 1032.
76. See Holland, supra note 45, at 372; ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. (Tent.
Draft No. 7, 1952).
77. Holland, supra note 45, at 372.
78. Id. at 370. See also ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X890 (a) 4d (Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1952).
79. Pp. 32-33 supra.
80. ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § 890(a)4 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1952).
81. Id. at 464-67.
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"income in respect of a decedent."s2 It has been pointed out,83 more-
over, that the exclusion of capital assets will not result in difficulty
because usually the decedent will have received payment during his
lifetime,'4 or have received a contract for payment which will itself
have been includible in gross income at the time of the sale,'9 or will
have received a contract subject to the rules respecting installment
obligations." As to assets which are neither stock in trade nor
capital, 7 these are arbitrarily grouped with capital assets and, there-
fore, under this view not covered by section 691.88
This view de-emphasizes the significance of the point at which a
transaction is to be considered sufficiently matured during decedent's
lifetime for section 691 to be made applicable.
Last of all, the Final Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter
J to the Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation, recommended
the addition of a new subsection to section 691, the purpose of which
was to define "income in respect of a decedent." 89 Among the items
so defined therein is "an amount... which equals so much of the
proceeds of a sale, exchange, or other disposition of property made
prior to the death of the decedent, as would have been includible in
the decedent's gross income if he had received such proceeds." 90 This
would seem to leave open the question under what circumstances a
sale shall be deemed to have been "made" during decedent's lifetime,
and thus exhibits the same deficiency as the "causal relationship"'91
approach. Moreover, unlike the classification of assets test, the
Advisory Committee proposal does not differentiate between those
sales which would and those which would not produce capital gain or
loss results.
In any event, except as to matters relating to partnerships, no
amendments to section 691 found their way into the Trust and Part-
nership Revision Bill of 1960.92 Thus it would appear that so far as
Congress is concerned, the matter remains open.
82. Holland, supra note 45, at 370.
83. ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § 890(a)4g (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1952).
84. In this event there is no problem.
85. See Surrey & Warren, Cases on Federal Income Taxation 604-08 (1st ed.
1954).
86. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691 (a) (4).
87. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(2)-(5).
88. ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X890(a) (May 1952 Draft).
89. Final Report of Subchapter J Advisory Group, Dec. 28, 1958.
90. Id. at 61.
91. P. 39 supra.
92. H.R. Rep. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss1/7
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed the origin and development of section 691,"
the conflicting and analogous policy judgments which converge in its
operation,9' and the problems its language presents. 5 We have also
examined several alternatives for a shift in its approach to the sales
area." From this analysis certain conclusions can be drawn to resolve
the difficulties presented.
First, section 691 should apply to the proceeds of a disposition by
decedent's successor in interest only if the gain from the disposition
would have represented ordinary income to the decedent had he lived
to complete the tran'saction.
Second, this result should obtain only (a) where the action taken by
the decedent during his lifetime with respect to the transaction was
sufficient to create an enforceable obligation upon his successor,
whether in law or equity, or (b) where decedent held out the asset
involved for sale to his customers in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness.
These conclusions are based upon the assumption that a major shift
away from the policy of section 1014 is both unwise and unlikely, and
so impinge on it only to the extent necessary to eliminate substantial
avoidance and inequity. At the same time they avoid the difficulty of
a test based upon an asset classification approach, while conforming to
the underlying basis for such an approach.
Thus, the omelet may be fashioned to satisfy the appetite for
revenue without offending the taste for consistency and rationality.
93. Pp. 31-32 supra.
94. Pp. 34-36 supra.
95. Pp. 37-38 supra.
96. Pp. 39-41 supra.
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